The Southern Gate to Fortress Europe by Andrijasevic, Rutvica
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
The Southern Gate to Fortress Europe
Book Section
How to cite:
Andrijasevic, Rutvica (2006). The Southern Gate to Fortress Europe. In: Kilpadi, Pamela ed. Policy Perspectives:
Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe. Busapest: Open Society Institute, pp. 30–51.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2007, 2006 Open Society Institute
Version: [not recorded]
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://www.policy.hu/ipf/policyperspectives/
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk

3CONTENTS
Mission Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Preface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Europe’s Transforming Identity
  What Values for Europe?    Michae l  Emer son . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
  The Role of Islam in Europe: Multiple Crises?    Amel  Boubekeur  and Samir  Amghar   . . . . . . . 25
  The Southern Gate to Fortress Europe    Rutvica  Andri ja š ev i ć  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Ethnic Relations in the Caucasus
  ‘Reliable’ and ‘Unreliable’ Peoples:  The Ingush-Ossetian Conﬂict and Prospects  
  for Post-Beslan Reconciliation    Ekater ina Sokir ianskaia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
  Conﬂict in Georgia: Religion and Ethnicity    Archi l  Gege shidze  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
  Inter-Group Relations and Conﬂicts in the North Caucasus: Stereotypes and Realities   
    Alexey  Gunya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Polit ical Ideology and Religious Tolerance in Russia
  Ideology and Intolerance    Pave l  Bayov  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
  Muslims in the Russian and Tatarstan Media: Prospects for Media Policy Promoting Tolerance   
    Ir ina Kouznet sova-Morenko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
  Outsourcing De Facto Statehood:  
  Russia and the Secessionist Entities in Georgia and Moldova    Nicu Pope s cu  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Polit ical Identity and Human Rights in Turkey
  Islamic Identity and the West: Is Conﬂict Inevitable?    Ihsan Dağı  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
  Religion and Conﬂict: Lessons from the Frontlines of Social Transformation  
  in Women’s Human Rights    Nüket  Kardam and Yanni s  Tous su l i s  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
  The Role of the Media and Local Initiatives in the Presentation of the Annan Plan in North Cyprus   
    Dilek  Lat i f  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Islam and Policy in Central Europe
  Muslim Minorities and Czech Society    Ji ř í  Schneider  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
  The Mosque Debate and Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Slovenia    Natal i ja  Vrečer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Lessons from the Post-War Balkans
  Interethnic Policymaking for Interethnic Tolerance    Is lam Yusuf i  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
  Islam in Southeast European Public Discourse: Focusing on Traditions of Tolerance 
    Simeon Evs ta t i ev  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
  Religion, Media and National Security in Albania    Aldo Bumçi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
  Stumbling Block on the Road to Democracy: Security Sector Reform in Serbia 
    Mladen Momči lović  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
  Local Governance Reform in Kosovo: Milestones for the Promotion of Tolerance   
    Algirdas  Petkevic iu s  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
 
From the Archives
  Recent Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
  Photo Archives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
c
o
n
te
n
ts
 
 
Policy Perspectives 
Islam and Tolerance 
in Wider Europe 
 
 
Europe’s Transforming 
Identity 
The Southern Gate to 
Fortress Europe 
Rutvica Andrijasevic 
 
Pages:30-50 
June 2006 
 
 
Collected articles available at: 
http://www.policy.hu/ipf/policypersp/ 
 
 
 
Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License. 
P o l i c y  P e r s p e c t i v e s   l   I s l a m  a n d  T o l e r a n c e  i n  W i d e r  E u r o p e   l   I P F  2 0 0 630
The Southern Gate  
to Fortress Europe
Rutvica  Andri jašević
It is the last day of August 2005 and on the airport runway in Lampedusa, a small Italian island situated south of Sicily, yet another deportation of ‘undocumented’ migrants from Africa and the Middle East is taking place. Two planes parked 
approximately twenty meters away from each other are waiting for passengers. A group 
of tourists pours out of the airport building and strolls toward the Air One airplane, an 
Italian tourist carrier. The adjacent Air Adriatic plane, a private Croatian air company, is
boarded by a group of passengers walking in ﬁxed formation. Four police oﬃcers (one in 
back, one in front, and one on each side of the procession) wearing civilian clothes and 
large black protection gloves lead the group of ten migrants from the detention camp to 
the airplane. The plane is parked only ﬁfteen meters or so away from the barbed wire that
separates the runaway from the camp. From the perspective of an informed observer, the 
ordinariness of the event exacerbates its violence.
Seven groups of ten men are led to the plane. The migrants boarding the plane are
all dressed the same: they wear dark blue sports trousers with a matching jacket and carry 
Migrants behind barbed wire at the ‘holding center’ on the southern Italian island of Lampedusa    Matias Costa, Panos
Rutvica Andrijašević is an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) post-doctoral fellow at the 
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford. Her 2004–6 research as an 
International Policy Fellow beneﬁted from comments by Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild
of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels where the policy study was initially drafted, as 
well as Julia Harrington of the Open Society Institute Justice Initiative. 
Copyrighted by the author under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License.
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a white plastic shopping bag. Behind the barbed wire there are several hundred migrants 
seated in small groups on the soil. When the plane takes oﬀ most of them are on their
feet, waving. 
Earlier the same day another group of migrants is escorted by police from the 
detention center to the port just down the hill and transferred by a ferry operated by a 
company called Siremar, ﬁrst to Porto Empedocle and then on to the detention center
in the Southern Italian town of Crotone. This time, following a rigorous 20-minute
march from the camp, the migrants were made to sit on the ground behind a large 
van while tourists boarded the ferry and enjoyed their last unperturbed glimpse of the 
town of Lampedusa. Dressed in the usual dark blue sport outﬁts and carrying white
plastic bags, the migrants were transferred from the pier to an isolated space in the lower 
part of the ferry, while police blocked access to the port and prohibited any ﬁlming or
photographing.   
 
Between Libya and Sicily: The criminalization of migration
Positioned some two hundred kilometers south of Sicily and three hundred kilometers 
north of Libya, in 2004 the island of Lampedusa became the main point of arrival for 
boats carrying undocumented migrants and asylum seekers from Libya to Italy. The
‘temporary stay and assistance center’ (CPTA) in Lampedusa is one of eleven existing 
migration holding centers, most of which are located in the south of Italy. Migrants 
typically depart from Libya in overcrowded, makeshift boats and undertake the perilous 
sea journey which can last up to several weeks. Once in the Italian waters near Lampedusa, 
the boats are intercepted by Italian border guards and migrants are transferred to the 
Lampedusa holding center. After staying in the center for a period that usually varies 
between ﬁve and forty-ﬁve days, the majority of migrants are transferred to CPTAs in
Sicily or southern Italy and others are expelled to Libya.   
The Italian-Libyan partnership agreement initially signed in 2000 to ﬁght terrorism,
organized crime and illegal migration was extended in 2003 and 2004 to include a 
migration readmission agreement, training for Libyan police oﬃcers and border guards,
and Italian-funded detention and repatriation programs for irregular migrants in Libya. 
The aim of these schemes is to deter irregular migration and prevent further migrant
deaths at sea by combating smuggling networks. Paradoxically, research described here 
suggests that these policies may actually ‘illegalize’ the movement of certain groups 
of migrants, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the involvement of smuggling 
networks in human traﬃcking.  
Due to pressure from the Italian government, the European Union (EU) lifted 
the arms embargo on Libya on October 11, 2004, allowing Libya to purchase (from 
Italy) technological surveillance equipment and speedboats, and run training programs 
initiated by Italian policemen. Only recently it has emerged (following the European 
Commission’s report on its technical mission to Libya in December 2004) that Italy is 
moreover ﬁnancing the construction of three detention camps in Libya as well as the
deportations of ‘irregular’ migrants from Libya further to Sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt.1 
The deportation from Italy to detention camps in Libya followed the signing in August 
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2004 of an agreement between the two countries on combating illegal migration into the 
EU. Despite repeated European Parliament, UN Human Rights Committee, and NGO 
requests to make the agreement public, its contents continue to remain undisclosed.
In 2004, a total of 10,497 migrants, including 412 minors and 309 women, 
transited through the Lampedusa CPTA.2 No oﬃcial data is available on the Lampedusa
migrants’ countries of origin or reasons for migrating. While the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) points to the presence of refugees and asylum 
seekers ﬂeeing persecution among those detained at Lampedusa as well as among those
expelled to Libya, the Lampedusa authorities refer to those 
held at their center as ‘illegal migrants’ and claim that there are 
virtually no asylum seekers present among migrants who depart 
from Libya. The authorities also assert that the majority of third-
country nationals at the center are economic migrants of Egyptian 
nationality.3 However, data gathered at Lampedusa by Médecins 
sans Frontières and the Italian nongovernmental organization 
ARCI identiﬁes the migrants’ primary regions of origin to be the
Middle East (Iraq and Palestine), Maghreb (namely from Morocco, 
Tunisia and Algeria), Horn of Africa (including Sudan), and Sub-
Saharan Africa.4 Despite the continuity of migratory ﬂows from
North Africa to the south of Italy since the end of the 1990s, more 
consistent data on migrants’ countries of origin and the nature of 
their journeys remains unavailable.
The Italian navy arrests a group of migrants after intercepting their boat off Lampedusa    Matias Costa, Panos
No information is available concerning the whereabouts of migrants and asylum seekers 
expelled from Lampedusa to Libya. Human Rights Watch believes that the majority are 
detained in Libyan detention camps, where migrants and asylum seekers in particular  
are often the victims of arbitrary detention, inexistent or unfair trials, killings,  
disappearances and torture    Matias Costa, Panos
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The detentions and deportations at Lampedusa came to the attention of the
wider public in early October 2004, when more than one thousand ‘irregular’ migrants 
were expelled to Libya on military and civilian airplanes. These collective deportations
occurred in a highly charged political atmosphere surrounding the proposal advanced 
by German Minister of Interior Otto Schily and Italian Minister Giuseppe Pisanu to 
establish refugee processing centers in North Africa. Apparently, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom backed the project, while France and Spain were opposed. The
proposal—initially put forward by the UK and rejected during the 2003 Thessaloniki
Summit—envisioned the establishment of ‘regional protection zones’ and ‘transit 
processing centers’ located outside the external borders of the European Union.5 Under 
this proposal, asylum-seekers and refugees would submit their EU asylum claims and 
wait in these centers until their applications were processed.6 Even though the proposal 
for ‘processing centers’ was rejected by France, Spain and Sweden in October 2004, the 
EU informal Justice and Home Aﬀairs Council considered ﬁve pilot projects proposed
by the European Commission (EC) and co-funded by the Netherlands. These projects
aim to upgrade existing ‘processing’ facilities and develop asylum laws in Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.7 
European governments in support of such schemes consider expulsions to Libya a 
necessary measure to counter ‘the emergency’ represented by the inﬂux of boat-people
from Libya and the urgent need to deter ‘a million’ waiting in Libya from reaching 
Italian shores.8 The European Commission claims that detention and deportation are
indispensable measures for countering undocumented migration and ensuring a credible 
and eﬀective Europe-wide immigration policy.
The Italian coastguard escorts migrants ashore off Lampedusa    Matias Costa, Panos
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Available research and analysis raise serious doubts about the validity of these 
claims, however. Existing data shows that the majority of irregular migrants have entered 
Italy with a valid visa and become undocumented only after the visa expired or after 
they overstayed their residence permit. Only 10 percent of undocumented migrants 
currently residing in Italy entered the country ‘illegally’ by sea.9 Furthermore, Libya’s 
migrant population is made up primarily of labor migrants from neighboring African 
countries who have played a key role in Libya’s informal economy for several decades, 
while irregular migrants who transit through Libya on their way to Europe represent 
only a small segment of the country’s migrant population. In other words, reducing 
Libya’s current migratory patterns to an unprecedented surge of ‘illegal’ migration is 
erroneous and misleading (Pliez 2005). The use of terms by European politicians such
as ‘the emergency’ recap the fantasy of ‘the invasion’ of Eastern Europeans into Western 
Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall—now commonly referred to as ‘the invasion 
that never happened.’
Libya’s migratory reality is far from being, as suggested by the image of ‘a million 
illegal migrants’ sailing to Europe from Libyan shores, a country of emigration or a 
transit route for clandestine migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa to Italy. On the contrary, 
Libya is primarily a country of destination and immigration for the Maghreb (the region 
of Africa north of the Sahara desert and west of the Nile). Foreign nationals constitute 
approximately 25 to 30 percent of Libya’s total population. Large-scale economic and 
social development schemes in the 1970s, launched thanks to petroleum industry 
revenues, relied in the ﬁrst instance on migrant laborers from Egypt. Egyptian nationals,
employed mainly in the agriculture industry and education, constitute the largest 
migrant group in Libya today.10 Libya is home also to a large Maghrebi community 
from Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria,11 and the country’s economic development relies 
on cheap and seasonal labor from the neighboring Niger, Chad and Sudan.12 The inﬂux
of migrant workers from sub-Saharan states is prompted by Libya’s reorientation away 
from pan-Arab and toward pro-African policies13 and its active role in the foundation 
of the Community of Sahel-Saharan states (CEN-SAD), an economic project aimed 
at greater regional cooperation and integration via the free circulation of people and 
goods between member states.14 Migrant workers from Sudan, Chad and Niger, facili-
tated by Libya’s open border policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, are generally temporary 
and pendular laborers working in sectors such as agriculture, tourism and local trade 
rather than, as commonly assumed, the source of irregular migratory movement to 
Europe.15 
Nevertheless, stoking the public’s fear of an immigrant invasion serves Italy’s political 
interests. Under discussion since 2002, Italy has failed to pass an organic law on the right 
to asylum along with most other European states, and is especially reluctant to admit 
asylum seekers and refugees onto its territory. A study of migratory patterns in 2004 
indicates that refugees ﬂeeing African conﬂicts in countries such as Sudan and Somalia are
likely among the migrants who transit Libya.16 Because the Libyan government does not 
recognize asylum seekers and the authorities of the Lampedusa holding center allegedly 
classify the majority of migrants as Egyptians without investigating their nationality, 
there is no way to identify individuals who may be ﬂeeing persecution.
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The existing data on the number of
deportations from the detention centers 
further questions the argument that 
detention is indispensable to assure an 
eﬀective removal policy. A recent report shows that out of 11,883 irregular migrants
detained in Italian ‘temporary stay and assistance centers’ in 2004, less than half were 
deported while the rest were released or escaped.17 As regards asylum seekers, the 9,019 
asylum applications ﬁled in Italy in 2004 translate into the country receiving roughly 16
asylum seekers per 100,000 inhabitants.18 Even if doubled, the total number of requests 
for asylum in Italy would be of 34 per 100,000—still far below the EU average of 60 
asylum seekers per 100,000 inhabitants.19 While this increase is hypothetical, it helps 
illustrate the gap between asylum trends in Italy when compared with other EU countries 
and highlights Italy’s reluctance to assume its share of asylum responsibilities in Europe.
Over the past decade, European governments incapable of harmonizing a common 
or coherent immigration policy and faced with growing public intolerance toward 
largely Muslim economic migrants have increasingly invoked the alleged existence of an 
‘asylum crisis’ and have substituted national asylum programs for formal immigration 
schemes.20 The ‘asylum crisis’ strategy has proven successful in garnering public support
for European governments to contract out their asylum responsibilities to less capable 
government structures in developing countries. While Europe’s actual asylum situation is 
certainly less acute now than in past decades and cannot be described as a crisis, Europe 
is experiencing a far less publicly visible ‘human rights crisis.’ Long-standing precepts of 
refugee protection in Europe have been seriously eroded, further exacerbating intolerance 
toward immigrants who are more frequently categorized as ‘illegal.’ 
NGOs claim that the signing of the bilateral agreement 
between Libya and Italy in August 2004 led to widespread 
arrests in Libya of individuals from sub-Saharan Africa and 
the death of 106 migrants during subsequent repatriations 
from Libya to Niger    Matias Costa, Panos
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As recent research on human traﬃck-
ing has repeatedly shown, border controls, 
detentions and expulsion practices do not 
prevent people from moving from their 
countries of origin, nor from reaching 
Europe, but rather they increase the costs and dangers of migration. The EU’s enlargement
eastward has demonstrated that tightening border and visa controls enhances migrants’ 
vulnerability and furthers the interests of smuggling networks. If arranging a visa is not 
cheap and easy, migrants are not able to access (even when available) formal governmental 
channels for migration.21 Instead, they resort to irregular channels that exploit migrants’ 
legal vulnerability by charging higher fees for travel and documentation or proﬁting
from migrant labor at various points during the journey.22 Stricter immigration controls 
aimed at preventing traﬃcking do not necessarily protect migrants from abuse but can
increase the vulnerability of migrants to violence during travel while increasing the costs 
of ‘doing business’ for traﬃckers23 and leaving ample space for third party proﬁteering
and abuse. 
European officials and civil society united in outrage
Since the much-publicized mass deportations, Lampedusa has been repeatedly denounced 
for alleged procedural irregularities and human rights violations. Consistent and numerous 
allegations of degrading treatment of third-country nationals in detention, diﬃculties for
asylum seekers in gaining access to the asylum determination process, and large-scale 
expulsions to Libya prompted the European Parliament (EP), European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR), and United Nations’ Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) to call on 
Italy to respect the rights of asylum seekers and refugees to international protection 
and to refrain from collective expulsions24 of asylum seekers and irregular migrants to 
Libya—a country that has no asylum system, has not signed the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees, and practices the kind of large-scale expulsions of undocumented migrants in 
which 106 people recently lost their lives.
No information is available concerning the whereabouts of migrants and asylum 
seekers expelled to Libya.25 Human Rights Watch believes that the majority are detained 
in Libyan detention camps.26 Investigations by Amnesty International (AI) document 
that the Libyan government engages in the incommunicado detention of migrants 
In its ‘Resolution on Lampedusa’ in April 2005,  
the European Parliament called on Italy to refrain 
from collective expulsions, grant United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees access to the Lampedusa 
center, and guarantee the individual examination of asylum 
  Matias Costa, Panos
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and possible asylum seekers as well as suspected political opponents, torture while in 
detention, unfair trials leading to long-term prison sentences or the death penalty, and the 
‘disappearance’ and death of political prisoners in custody. Migrants and asylum seekers 
in particular are often the victims of arbitrary detention, non-existent or unfair trials, 
killings, and disappearances and torture in the detention camps.27 Once they are detained 
in Libya there is virtually no way for NGOs to assist them or verify the conditions of their 
detention and relative expulsion procedures. The Libyan detention centers are, in fact,
almost inaccessible to international organizations or human rights groups. The UNHCR
is unable to access people returned from Lampedusa to Libya, since it is impossible for 
the organization to operate according to its protection mandate in Libya. On January 
20, 2005 as well as in successive open letters to the Council and the Commission,28 
Amnesty International urged the Commission to publicly distance itself from the actions 
of the Italian authorities and to carry out an independent investigation regarding Italy’s 
compliance with international legal obligations as part of the EU acquis.29
NGOs claim that the signing of the bilateral agreement between Libya and Italy in 
August 2004 led to widespread arrests in Libya of individuals from sub-Saharan Africa30 
and the death of 106 migrants during subsequent repatriations from Libya to Niger.31 
NGOs point out that the improvised identiﬁcation of large numbers of migrants as
Egyptians at the Lampedusa holding center is the basis for forced collective removals of 
migrants, ﬁrst to Libya and later to Egypt, a country with which Libya collaborates on
matters of illegal migration.32 
Nevertheless, collective deportations from Lampedusa to Libya resumed in March, 
April, and June 2005. By August 2005 mass deportations were conducted on a nearly 
weekly basis after the International Organization for Migration (IOM) signed an 
agreement with Libya aimed at deterring irregular migration from and into the country.33 
As deaths of migrants increased at sea during the crossover to Italy and in the desert 
as a consequence of deportations from Libya, social movements, several NGOs and 
European institutions mobilized in order to spread information and put an end to these 
collective deportations. La Rete Antirazzista Siciliana (The Sicilian Antiracist Network)
video-recorded and circulated images of 
deportations at the Lampedusa camp,34 and 
a number of activists organized a protest 
on April 2, 2005—the European Day for 
Freedom of Movement—in front of the 
oﬃces of the Italian charter carrier Blue
Panorama in Rome, which succeeded in 
halting the company’s deportation ﬂights.35 
Following the October 2004 events, ten 
An Italian coastguard vessel brings 202 migrants ashore 
in Santa Maria di Leuca after intercepting their boat 
    Matias Costa, Panos
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European associations of NGOs working on migrant rights issues organized joint actions 
and ﬁled a complaint with the European Commission against Italy’s collective expulsions
of migrants to Libya.36 Moreover, Amnesty International urged the Commission on 
several occasions to halt the deportations and to investigate the detention practices of 
Italian authorities, while brieﬁng Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on the
human rights situation of migrants and asylum-seekers in Lampedusa.37 
In its ‘Resolution on Lampedusa’ in April 2005,38 the European Parliament called 
on Italy to refrain from collective expulsions, grant UNHCR access to the Lampedusa 
center, and guarantee the individual examination of asylum. On 15 and 16 September 
2005, a delegation of twelve MEPs working with the Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms 
and Rights, Justice and Home Aﬀairs (LIBE) arrived at Lampedusa to assess the center’s
procedures, treatment of the detainees, and the overall running of the Lampedusa 
center. As regards the conditions of detention, the Lampedusa camp was denounced 
for inadequate accommodation, poor hygienic conditions, and the use of coercive and 
violent police methods toward migrants during police-run removal operations to Libya. 
The overcrowding of the center, which has a maximum legal capacity of 180 persons, is
such that the average number of migrants detained during the summer months in 2005 
was between 300 and 400 and sometimes reaching up to 1,000 persons.39 
Based on the evidence, ten European NGOs have taken legal action against the 
Italian Government, ﬁling a complaint with the European Commission40 and calling on 
the Commission to sanction Italy for: 
 Violation of the right of defense and of all parties to be heard41 and hence the right 
to asylum as recognized by the Amsterdam Treaty
 Violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, 
provided for in article 4 of the European Charter of fundamental rights and article 
3 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms42 
Intended to coincide with a high-level 
EU Justice and Home Aﬀairs visit to Libya
in June 2005, a coalition of 13 European 
NGOs43 proposed to EU Member States 
and the Commission a number of core 
principles to be applied during migrant 
The Lampedusa holding center does not fulfil its main 
functions: it facilitates only a nominal amount of expulsions 
and perpetuates ill-treatment rather than offering assistance. 
To ensure that detention procedures and practices are 
in conformity with existing domestic and international 
standards, one short-term objective would be to mandate  
an independent monitoring body to make regular, 
unrestricted and unannounced visits to the center  
  Matias Costa, Panos
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repatriations to ensure that the policies fully respect the needs and 
dignity of individuals.44 In the complaint ﬁled with the European
Commission concerning the expulsions from the Lampedusa 
holding center to Libya, the NGOs called on the Commission to 
sanction Italy for:
 Violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions provided 
for in article 4 of the 4th Protocol of the European Charter of 
Human Rights (ECHR) and Fundamental Freedoms, article 
II-19-1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
 Violation of the non-refoulement principle45 prescribed in article 33 of the 1951 Ge-
neva Convention on Refugees and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture46
In its observations on Italy during 
the 85th Session of the UN Human Rights 
Committee in Geneva in November 
2005,47 the Committee raised the issue of 
the right to international protection and 
recalled the right of each person not to be 
expelled to a country where he/she might 
face torture or ill-treatment. Along similar 
lines, in its Resolution on Lampedusa the 
European Parliament called on Italy to 
refrain from collective expulsions to Libya 
and took the view that these expulsions 
constitute a violation of the principle of 
non-refoulement. The Parliament also called
on Libya to allow access to international 
observers, halt the expulsions and arbitrary 
arrests of migrants, ratify the Geneva Con-
vention, and recognize the mandate of the 
UNHCR. 
Italian authorities have responded to 
allegations of collective expulsions by in- 
voking article 10 of Law 189/2002 of the 
new Italian Immigration Act—in parti-
cular procedures regarding the refusal of 
entry (respingimento alla frontiera). The
Migrants being photographed for identification purposes at L’Orizonte refugee camp 
in Squinzano. Independent monitors are not allowed access to the Lampedusa holding center 
  Matias Costa, Panos
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authorities claim that removals from the 
Lampedusa center are not expulsions but 
rather refusals of entry determined on an 
individual basis. An expulsion needs to be 
decided by the judge and prohibits entry 
into Italy for ten years, while a ‘refusal of 
entry’ is an administrative measure that 
does not ban the migrant from entering 
Italian territory in the future.48 Irregular 
migrants reaching Lampedusa are served 
refusals of entry and returned to Libya because they have transited Libya prior to reaching 
Italy. Italian authorities insist that the refusals of entry are determined on a case-by-case 
basis and that since the majority of migrants reaching Lampedusa are economic migrants 
rather than refugees, Italy is not in violation of the refoulement principle nor in breach of 
the Geneva Convention.49 The Italian government has explained its refusal to disclose the
content of the bilateral agreement with Libya by saying that making the agreement public 
would diminish the success of countering smuggling and traﬃcking networks responsible
for organizing and proﬁting from irregular migration from Libya into Italy.  
Italy is developing future detention and expulsion schemes in collaboration with the 
IOM, a key partner for both the Italian and Libyan governments.50 Italy was scheduled 
to fund an IOM pilot project in Libya starting in August 2005.51 As far as Libya is 
concerned, following the agreement signed on August 9, 2005 for the opening of an 
IOM oﬃce in Tripoli,52 IOM and Libya deﬁned a program of activities supporting the
Libyan government in countering illegal migration and developing a long-term migration 
management approach under the Programme for the Enhancement of Transit and Irregular 
Migration Management (TRIM).53    
Who are the gate-keepers of Europe? 
Current European discourse on Libya and the EU’s immigration policies of detention 
and removal of undocumented migrants points to a series of ongoing transformations in 
Europe. A sound understanding of the implications of these transformations is crucial 
for academics, activists and policymakers alike. 
The proposal to establish extraterritorial migrant processing centers and the
construction of Italian-funded detention centers on Libyan territory, deportations to 
and from Libya, and joint Italian-Libyan police patrolling of the Libyan coastline are all 
instances that de-localize the EU’s external border from South Italy into Libyan territory. 
A Kurdish couple with their baby just arrived by boat to  
Santa Maria di Leuca    Matias Costa, Panos
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Consequently, they all challenge the idea of the EU’s external border as a ﬁrm border
between Italy and Libya and show that the southern EU border, rather than being a linear 
and stable geographical demarcation, is a discontinuous and porous space encompassing 
the area between southern Italy and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This reading of the border calls into question the common assumption that the
state regulates people’s entry/stay into its territory. States certainly play a crucial role but 
the example of current migration projects in Libya suggests that non-state actors such 
as the IOM partake, shape and determine state policy on migration. Questions arise 
regarding state sovereignty and the ways in which non-state actors regulate and manage a 
state’s migratory movements—functions traditionally reserved for the nation-state.   
There is currently wide consensus among scholars, activists and policy analysts that 
the tightening of immigration policies and strengthening of border controls has resulted 
in a reduction of legal channels for migration into the EU so that illegality has become 
a structural characteristic of modern migratory ﬂows. From this perspective, detention
camps for undocumented migrants in Italy (and in Europe) are not seen as institutions 
geared toward deportations, but rather sites producing the conditions of ‘deportability’ 
which function as ﬁlter mechanisms and allow states to selectively admit certain groups
of migrants (Karakayali and Tsianos 2004, Mezzadra 2004). Eﬀective scholarly scrutiny
and policy interventions depend upon the further development of analytic frameworks 
better able to grasp the ways in which detention centers create and uphold conditions for 
the hierarchization of access to labor and citizenship in Europe. 
Contracting out European sovereignty and human rights protection
The state practice of ‘contracting out’ also raises serious questions about IOM interven-
tions and ability to adequately protect the rights of migrants on behalf of states. In the case 
of the repatriations of irregular migrants and asylum seekers expelled from the Lampedusa 
holding center, IOM and states cooperate in obstructing asylum seekers’ right to asylum. 
Moreover, the fact that irregular migrants and asylum seekers are deported from Lampedusa 
without knowing that they are being transferred to Libya, that the removals are executed 
by force and that once in Libya migrants are again detained in police-guarded structures, 
raises serious doubts that the IOM-run repatriations from Libya can be identiﬁed as
voluntary. When decisions to return are made under duress or as an alternative to state-
run forced expulsions, ‘voluntary’ seems to designate an absence of viable options rather 
than a deliberate choice. IOM cannot be held responsible for the rule of law in the same 
way as sovereign states. However, in deporting irregular migrants and asylum seekers from 
Libya, IOM is to be seen as assuming joint responsibility for any violation of fundamental 
rights that asylum seekers and irregular migrants might suﬀer.
Furthermore, the current Italian–Libyan partnership on migration indicates a 
new reorientation of Libyan politics from a pro-African to a pro-European stance, with 
profound implications for Sub-Saharan migrants. Libya’s consequential tightening of its 
borders with Sub-Saharan neighbors is likely to clash with the long-established principle 
of the free movement of people that has been a cornerstone of regional cooperation 
and integration in the Sahel-Saharan region. This shift could destabilize current political
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relations between Libya and neighboring states and may further ‘illegalize’ movements of 
large groups of Sub-Saharan nationals.
Policy Recommendations: Legitimacy, transparency, accountability 
and in the management of state borders 
Given the fact that available data regarding the detention and deportation of irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers in Lampedusa and Libya are often contradictory and 
incomplete, bilateral agreements on irregular migration remain undisclosed, and the 
European Union framework oﬀers Member States wide discretion in applying restrictive
exceptions in national legislation, clearly deﬁned principles of legitimacy, transparency,
and accountability are needed to guide the EU and Member States undertaking migration 
management partnerships with neighboring countries.
 Legitimacy
 Migration holding centers are instruments facilitating the eﬀective repatriation of
third-country nationals who have entered Italy illegally. The Lampedusa holding
center does not fulﬁl its main functions, however: it facilitates only a nominal
amount of expulsions and perpetuates ill-treatment rather than oﬀering assistance.
To ensure that detention procedures and practices are in conformity with existing 
domestic and international standards, one short-term objective would be to mandate 
an independent monitoring body to make regular, unrestricted and unannounced 
visits to the Lampedusa holding center. The closure of the Lampedusa holding center
should constitute a longer term objective.54 Since the Lampedusa holding center 
is classiﬁed as a clearing station, Italy is likely to disregard established minimum
procedural and legal safeguards on return, removal and custody provided under the 
EU Return Directive. The closure of the Lampedusa holding center would prevent
future procedural violations and ensure that the rights of migrants and asylum 
seekers are not sidestepped by the Italian authorities.   
The ruins of boats used by migrants on the clandestine journey from North Africa, dumped half-submerged  
in the harbor of Lampedusa    Matias Costa, Panos
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 Transparency
 Whether carried out by the Italian and Libyan states or by the IOM, policies and 
schemes countering irregular migration from and into Libya are all characterized 
by a lack of transparency. Independent access and the transparency of information, 
programs and agreements between Italy and Libya regulating migration management 
are needed before an accurate assessment can be made of the situation regarding 
detention, expulsion and asylum along the EU’s southern border. Information 
regarding the number, frequency and destinations of the return ﬂights from the
Lampedusa holding center, the content of relevant Italy-Libya bilateral agreements 
and between Libya and the IOM, and the content of the contract for the TRIM 
Program cofunded by the EC must be made public in order to achieve a transparent 
EU policy on asylum and immigration.
 Accountability
 The EU must provide leadership and take a stand in upholding the protection of 
human rights within contexts of third-country partnerships on migration and asylum 
programs. Divergent interests between national and EU competencies over borders, 
asylum and immigration should not permit Member States to violate the principles 
of the EU Return Directive and disregard minimum safeguards on return. In cases 
where Member States or the EU ‘contract out’ migration management to the IOM, 
this must not exempt the EU, Italy or Libya from their international legal obligations 
under established norms prohibiting refoulement and protecting human rights. 
The lack of safeguards and control mechanisms protecting the established human
right to seek asylum and Italy’s tendency to circumvent its responsibilities on matters of 
asylum require an intervention from the European Parliament. 
The EP is directly involved in the decision-making process on
European asylum and immigration policy and should propose 
amendments to the Return Directive and the Action Plan on 
Libya requiring the observance of international human rights 
standards. In the absence of any EU monitoring mechanism in 
Libya, the EP should urgently visit those detention centers in 
Libya where detention and repatriation programs are funded by 
the EU and Italy. The EP’s intervention would play a crucial role
in achieving a transparent and democratic procedure working 
toward a common European asylum policy and help steer the 
debate away from a control-based and toward a rights-based 
approach.  
Michael, age 32, who is Eritrean, lies in a bed in a converted church which serves 
as an immigration reception center. He arrived in Lampedusa after a three-day long journey 
in a small fishing boat and has been waiting at the church for his residence permit 
for eight months    Alfredo D’Amato, Panos
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The implementation of detention 
and expulsion schemes that illegalize mig- 
ratory movements and erode the rights of 
migrants to seek asylum brings into 
question the political responsibility of 
all actors involved, whether they be gov- 
ernments, supranational bodies, or agen-
cies. The Italian and Libyan governments,
the European Union, and the Interna-
tional Organization for Migration all need 
to assume their share of responsibility for 
human rights violations resulting from the 
procedures and programs they implement 
both inside and outside the borders of the 
European Union.  
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meltingpot.org/articolo5676.html.
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